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In an imperfectly ccmpetitive market environ-  period, Morocco scaled down an extensive
ment, whether an economy gains from trade  system of quantitative restrictions. The econo-
liberalization is necessarily an empirical ques-  metric work focuses on industries subject to
tion.  How trade liberalization affects resource  binding import quotas before and after the
allocation depends not only on trade policies but  reforms.  Dutz explores the distribution of output
on the nature of oligopolistic interactions and the  adjustment to the changes in imports among
ease of entry into and exit from particular  incumbent firms in such industries.  He finds
industries.  that:
In addition to generally lowering domestic  * The more imports increased, the more firms
industry prices, an increase in imports in recently  tended to contract output.
liberalized industiies causes domestic firms to
adjust. Depending on assumptions in theoretical  * As imports increased, smaller firms were
models, domestic output (and the equilibrium  more likely to exit the industry than larger firms.
price) can either rise or fall after trade liberaliza-
tion.  * Among survivors, small firms also tended to
contract output proportionately more than larger
Dutz shows in an imperfectly competitive  firms.  Small firms are morc likely to bear the
(Coumot oligopoly) model that loosening a  brunt of an industry's contraction in output in
quota on elastically supplied imports will  response to an increase in imports.  (Dutz
typically cause smaller firms with high marginal  examincs the impact of firm market share on
costs to contract more (and to exit with a higher  firm output adjusurment  in percentage terms
probability) than larger firms with low costs.  rather than in levels; no evidence of a shift of
This "rationalization" effect, a redistribution of  production from small to large firms is therefore
resources from smaller to larger users, leads to  presented in this paper.)
lower industry-wide average costs and is an
important component of the welfarc impact of  * The available pcrinent  data provide tenta-
trade reform.  tive (though weak) evidence that firms with
higher marginal costs (as indicated by higher
Dutz examines the extent to which incum-  labor/output ratios) did have the smaller market
bent firms in certain imperfectly competitive  shares, suggesting that the trade reforms in
industries adjusted their output choice in Mo-  Morocco did result in the rationalization effects
rocco between 1984 and 1987. During this  that theory would predict.
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Over the past few years, a consensus has been emerging regarding the
impact of trade  liberalization on domestic welfare in an environment with imperfectly
competitive markets: whether or not an economy gains from trade  liberalization is
necessarily an empirical questionY  It is widely recognized that the effects of trade
liberalization on resource allocation depend not only on existing trade policies but on
the nature of oligopolistic  interactions and the ease of entry into and exit from par-
ticular industries.  Depending on the assumptions underlying specific theoretical models,
domestic output can fall or rise following  trade  liberalization; the equilibrium price may
also either fall or rise.Y Economic theory alone does not provide an unambiguous
answer.
The extent to which incumbent firms actually adjust their output choice in
response to  trade liberalization is examined in this paper.  Is there a systematic pattern
A/]  I am very grateful for helpful comments and discussions with Tim Besley, Tom
Bogart, David Card, John DiNardo, Avinash Dixit, Gene Grossman, Guy
Lacroix, Thomas Lemieux, Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, Daniel Sullivan, Jim Tybout and
Robert Willig.  I also thank participants at seminars at NYU Stern School of
Business, Princeton UJniversity,  Queen's University and at the  World Bank for
comments.  This paper is part of the World Bank research project "Industrial
Competition, Productive Efficiency  and Their Relation to Trade Regimes" (RPO-
674-46); I am appreciative for the opportunity to use data from the Moroccan
Ministry of Commerce and Industry.  Financial support from the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada and funding from a Sloan grant to
the International Finance Section at Princeton University is gratefully ack-
nowledged.
2/  See, in particular, the survey by Richardson (1988).
In a symmetric oligopoly model, Buffie and Spiller (1986) show that, in the
short-run, a rise in domestic firm output in response to an increase in imports is
consistent with existence and stability conditions.  For price to increase in the
long-run in their model, the degree of competition (as captured by a firm-
specific conjectural variations parameter)  must increase as the  number of firms
falls.-2-
of firm output response to a loosening of import quotas?  Do larger firms contract
output more than their smaller rivals, less than their r.vals, or do tiey  expand output?
If firm size reflects cost efficiency and large firms are more cost efficient, then ottput
'rationalization" following  trade  reform, with resonrces shifting from smaller to larger,
more cost efficient users may be welfare-improving. At the firm level, competing
theories exist to  explain how contraction differs by firm size.,/  At. the industry level,
there is a general presumption that the more competitive the  industry, the larger the
industry outpui adjustment following  an exogenous increase in imports.  Holding
technology constant, highly concentrated industries with substantial rents have scope to
compress these rents and therefore  may contract output only a little or not at all in
response to trade liberalization.  More competitive industries, on the other hand, with
no margin of slack to compress, will have to adjust more on the output side.  This
perspective suggests that the domestic industry output response to trade liberalization
may reveal information about the degree of competition in the domestic market.  To
my knowledge, relatively few empirical studies of such firm and industry output
A/  See Lieberman (1989) for a review of theoretical findings on divestment "I
declining industries.  Differences in efficiency  among firms, with larger firms
being more cost efficient, would cause smaller producers to exit earlier during a
decline in demand.  On the other  hand, in a Cournot-Nash model where firms
are  equally efficient and under the assumption of all-or-nothing capacity reduc-
tion, large firrrs exit first since smaller firms can remain profitable over a longer
period as demand falls to zero.  Under a similar model but with continuous
capacity adjustment, large firms reduce capacity first; subsequent capacity
reductions as demand falls further are  predicted to be identical across firms.
See Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1987).-3-
adjustment exist, and even fewer examine adjustment as a response to trade  liberaliza-
tion.:/  No study employs as detailed firm-level data as this one.
This study seeks to explore the distribution of output adjustment to
industry-specific  shocks (here, a reduction in still-binding  quota levels), both across
asymmetric firms within a given industry and also among industries.  't  examines, in a
heterogeneous-firm context, the positive impact of changes in a particular trade  policy.
The study is based on a sample of approximately 750 manufacturing firms drawn from
those surveyed by Morocco's Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the years 19S4
ana  ..  l.  Among industrializing countries that have recently implemented a major
trade  reform, Morocco was chosen because of the particularly appropriate nature of its
industrial data.  For  1984 (at the onset of Morocco's trade  liberalization program) and
for 1987 (four years into the program), a special supplement to the annual survey was
included to collect much more disaggregated production data.  I was also able to
collect data on import values and degree of quota protection at the same level of
disaggregation, and to match it to the  industrial nomenclature.  Work at a more
aggregate level would mask the simultaneous loosening of quotas on some products and
tightening of quotas on other products within the same industrial sector.  Significant
changes in quotas across different industries prcvide a natural experiment that allows
the testing of firm output responsiveness as a function of pre-reform firm size.
The following  section presents a theoretical specification of firm and
industry adjustment to an exogenous increase in imports.  The analysis focuses on the
(partial) equilibrium impact of such trade liberalization on domestic firms' outputs and
5/  Recent studies that analyze growth rates of plants or firns while explicitly
considering plant or firm failure include Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989),
Evans (1987a, 1987b) and Hall (1987).  Two interesting papers examining
closely-related issues involving  the  relationship between an industry's trade
pattern  and the industry's structure and performance are  Roberts (1989) and
Tybout (1989). on Colombia and Chile, respectively.*4-
on domestic welfare.  Section III con+*ins  a detailed description of the data  used in the
study.  Section IV then p,esents the statistical framework and reports the  empirical
results.  A final section provides concluding comments and some suggestions for further
research in this area.
The evidence from the trade reform experienLe  suggests that firm output
contraction is more pronounced the larger the increase in imports.  Importantly, both
the probability of exit and the percentage contractio:i in output among survivors is
larger for small firms than for larger firms.  Both these forces provide evidence that
resources may be shifting on average from smaller to larger firms in response to an
increase in imports.  If large firms are more cost efficient, as both theory and the data
suggest, such a reallocation of output among firms is likely to be an additiona. source
of welfare gain from trade  liberalization.§/
II.  An Asvmmetnr Oligopolv Model of Outgut Adiustment
The theoretical framework of this study is a domestic oligopoly model of
firm output adjustment where competing firms are not equally efficient.  Domestic
firms in a given industry j are assumed to produce a homogene.-us good for the home
market; a foreign good potentially competes with domestic production, with the actual
level of imports determined by a binding quota."  For most of the theoretical analysis
and for the empirical implementation, the foreign good will be assumed to be a perfect
W  'lhis  paper  provides evidence that rationalization (in the sense of a reallocation
of output from smaller to larger incumbent firms) occurred following  a particular
trade  liberalization episode.  Further work is needed to combine these results
with the effect of new entrant  behavior on welfare.
2/  What is crucial is that the international price be low enough so that the quota is
always filled.-5-
substitute for domestic production.A' Trade liberalization acts like a shift parameter  on
the residual demand facing domestic suppliers.  A higher level of imports as the quota
is relaxed decreases the residual demand for eom-estic  output.  Let d, -estic  firms face
the residual demand pi(Qj,Mj;a),  where pi is domestic price in industry j, Qj is domestic
producers' total output, Mj is the exogenously-imposed  binding import quota and the
shift variable a represents an economy-wide shock (for example, changes in real
national income); residual demand is downward sloping (p'q<O) and clearly shifts in as
the quota is relaxed (PiM<O).  It is assumed that p,,>O.  With perfect substitutability
between  domestic  and  foreign  output,  P'Q=PpM  and  pi=pi2.
Each domestic firm's technology is summarized by a quadratic cost
function.  Firms can differ according to both  the level of sunk capital invested K,j  and
an exogenous efficiency parameter  ei, (representing, for example, differing managerial
ability).  The general form of firm i's technology can be summarized by the cost
function:
.(w,qj,ejp,K,)  =  a'(w,ejj,Kf>)  +  b'(w,ejj,K,#)q# 1 +  (w,ej,Kj)qq2 (1)
where q# is firm i's output and w is the vector of factor prices.  ImporEantly,  CjqK <  0
so that additional capital lowers the marginal cost curve; non-sunk fixed i.u3tS  are
increasing in K.  KY is firm i's equilibrium capacity choice given anticipated (pre-
/j  If the imported good is an imperfect substitute to the domestic good within a
given industry, domestic firms retain more market power as the quantitative
trade  barrier is relaxed than in the perfect substitutes case.  This alternative
assumption may be explored in subsequent work, especially for the most relevant
industries.-6-
liberalization) market conditions.Yl  Total and marginal cost are  alsc increasing in c: a
better-managed firm is characterized bv a lower e.
Firm i's profits in industry j are ir#(q 1j,Q. 1!,Mj) - p1(%+Qij.,Mj;O)q  -
C (rLj,ej,,KY.),  where Q# - Qj - qj, the aggregate industry output of all firms other than
firm i.  Firms are  assumed to behave aw  Cournot competitors, wi h the equilibrium
being Nash in quantities.A 2 Firm i's first-order condition, air/aq%  =  0, is
pi(Qj,M;a)  +  q,p#Q(Qj,Mj;a)  - Cdjq  =  0  i=1,...n.  (2)
It is instructive to re-write equation (2) as:
CL*Q-(,e  g  =  (3)
=p'Q(Qi (MP,a),Ndj,a)
where cog denotes firm i's output at the noncooperative equilibrium and Qj, is total
equilibrium output of all domestic competitors.  Firms with lower marginal cost (more
capital, better  rnanaged) have larger equilibrium output levels.  In equilibrium, firm size
reflects cost efficiency.
To determine the effect of a small loosening of the quota on firm output,
its effect on aggregate.  output must first be determined.  Totally differentiating fELm  i's
first-order condition (2) given that de#=dKY,=0  yields
2/  A fuller model might attempt to relate the distribution of sunk asset sLocks
across firms (K's) to the distribution of efficiency  parameters  (e's), a relation
which depends on views of capital market conditions. This extension and  ts
empirical implementation, making use of the predicted correlation between K's
and e's, are beyond the scope of this paper.
lQ/  The analysis can be generalized in a straightforward fashion to include conjec-
tural variation equilibria, allowing  for more or less aggressi,.  . behavior by firms.dq-j  - *  f%4'MI  * dM  - LslQZ  QI  *  dQj  +  ±pj"+q4s  u  da
Cjqq-P/Q  C)qq-PQ  CJqq-iQ
=-Yu4  dMj - AU  dCZ)  + wij  da  (4)
Two effects arise from the loosening of the quota.  There is both a direct effect, as
firm i adjusts to the increase in imports, and an indirect eftect, as firm i adjusts to the
aggregate domestic output response to the rise in imports: 'y#  and  measure firm i's
output responses to  import changes and aggregate domestic output changes, respective-
ly.  An economy-wide shock a will have an additional impact on firm output captured
by wjj.
For the remainder or the analysis, let pI=p'(Qj+M,;a); under this assump-
tion of perfect substitutability between doinestic output and impbrts, Yij  =  xij, so that
dqji =  - \jXdQj+dMj)+w#d6.  Each  firm's  output  cha-ige  therefore  depends  critically on
its xii. How much each firm adjusts to the total change in industry output (dQj+dMj)
wJ11  depend on how these xij vary with firm size.  For a given increase in imports,
ceteris paribus. small firms will bear the brLnt of any industry output contraction if Xij
is decreasing in %;  the likelihood of this will be discussed shortly, in the  context of the
estimation equation.  Note that under two standard assumptions on Cournot equi-
librium,W  that industry marginal revenue slopes downward (a weak condition for
existence  implying 1YQ+%piQQ  <  0) and  that  each  fir;-. s residual  demand  curve
intersects its marginal cost curve from above (Cjqq > pQ, a weak stability condition),  ,A
>  0 for all firms.  The sign of wij  depends on how the economy-wide shock affects the
slope of the inverse demand curve, but will likely be positive (unless pig  is sufficiently
negative).  Summing equation (4) across firms and letting Aj - aij and  Q*  ;  yields:
Llj  See Shapiro (1989).- 8-
dQj a  _*dMLj  +  _  do  (5)
1+tj  1+A,
Ceteris paribus. aggregate domestic output will fall in response to an exogenous
increase in irnports.  The effect on aggregate output of a siniultaneous economy-wide
shock (dc4O) is more ambiguous.  In the case of a growing econo:  .y,  where  la>O
represents an increase in real national income, the per-firm response to a positive
aggregate shock (if wij>O  for sufficient firms such that n~>O)  will tend to increase
aggregate output.  The adjustnient of firms to such a positive economy-wide shock will
tend to attenuate  the aggregate contraction in response to  the trade  shock, or may
even result in a net increase in aggregate output.
The effect of a loosening of the quota on individual domestic firms'
output choices follows directly by substituting the industry output response (5) into
equation (4):
dcqhj  =  \j_  * dM1 +  ±  )w  * da
1+Ai  1+Ai
- (1(1+Ai)4[;±Q#VQQI*dMjLY +  +  (Q/(1+  A)[PQ+.i>fl'dc(6)
c'qq -PQ  0 qP~Q
Each firm's output adjustment to an increase in imports, ceteris paribus, depends both
on indLlstry-specific  terms (the slope and curvature of demand functions) as well as on
firm-specific  terms (pre-reform equilibrium output and the curvature of the firm's cost
function).
In the empirical estimation of this relationship across industries, it is more
natural to  examine the impact of market share (rather than value of production) on
percentage output adjustment (rather than adjustment in levels).  Such a formulation
allows magnitudes to be compared across industries.  In addition, since equilibrium- 9  -
output across finns depends only on cost variables, it is convenient to re-express the
adjustment equation either exclusively  in terms of cost parameters  or in terns  of
output.  Since the data set to be used contains very detailed output figures but limrited
cost information, it is preferable to substitute out for COWq.  Given quadratic cWsts,  c'qq
equals 2f  i; by substituting the assumed cost function (1) for CJq  in equation (2), 2?, can
be shown to equal (pO+qiJpQ.-bij)/q.  Substituting this expression into equation (6), and
re-expressing the relationship in proportional terms yields:
d  ij  +  [+±¢j  +/(1+K))+s±.p  Q)Jda  (7)
%  pl - bli  1  1+A.  M.  p*  b'i
where sj*  a,%/Qj, firm i's market share in industry j.  This adjustment equation forms
the basis of the empirical estimation.
For a given percentage increase in imports, ceteris paribus. firm output
adjustmer,  is a function of pre-reform firm size.  Larger firms in Cournot equilibrium
are  characterized by lower marginal cost levels, where Cq=  b(w,e 1,i()  +  2f(w,ei,)q,;
such firms have lower e and/or larger K.  If big firms have lower b than small firms,
then the denominator of the first term i'  larger for big firms.  This effect suggests a
smaller percentage contraction for big firms.  Note that the numerator of the first term.
is negative if industry marginal revenue slopes down.  Therefore for convex demand,Lk
the numerator will be less negative for bigger firms, also suggesting a smaller per-
centage contraction for big firms.  Both effects reinforce each other: assuming convex
demand and a negative numerator, the numerator is less negative and the denominator
2/  The assumption of convex demand seems more appropriate  than linear or
concave demand as a working assumption to determine the likely direction of
firm adjustment; isoelastic demand functions, for example, seem in general to fit
data much better than linear functions.- 10  -
is larger for big firms.  Under these conditions, small firms are predicted to  contract
more in percentage terms than big firms in response to a given percentage increase in
imports.
In the presence of an ecoriomy-wiae  shock (when dcA),  equation (7)
highlights the existence of a firm size - firm adjustment relationship that  is independent
of the trade shock.  For a growing economy, the likely positive second term (unless
p'2>O is sufficiently small in magnitude and ps2 is sufficiently  negative) will attenuate
the firm output contraction from the loosening of the quota.  Importantly, the mag-
nitude of the per-finn adjustmnent  to the economy-wide  shock will also depend on pre-
reform firm size.  The relation between firm size and firm adjustment is more am-
biguous here.  Again, if big firms have lower b than small firms, then the denomLnator
is larger for big firms.  This effect here suggests a smaller percentage expansion for big
firms.  Given that pi2>O, the  numerator reinforces this tendency if piQ'< 0 (as long as
the second part of the term is not significantly  less negative for big firms).  However,
the numerator suggests a larger expaIision for big firms if p1Q >0.  While the extent of
firm adjustment to an economy-wide  shock clearly depends on pre-reform firm size, the
direction of that dependence within this framework is a question that can only be
resolved at the empirical level.  Equation (7) underlines the importance of controlling
for a more general relationship between size and adjustment in the empirical
implementation in order to isolate the import-related size effect.
Within this model, for non-infinitesimal  changes in imports, the same set
of variables predicting firm output contraction also predict exit.  Given the assumed
convexity of the firm's cost function and recurring non-sunk fixed costs, exit is a
consistent outcome to avoid large fixed costs.  In concentrated industries with convex
demand where differences in output between smallest and biggest firw's are large, small
frms  contract more than large ones in response to an increase in imports, ceteris
paribus  and very small firms exit.  While the same analytic framework is used here to- 11 
unify views of contraction and exit, the purpose in this section is merely to suggest
which variables are  significant in affecting firm output adjustment.  More sophisticated,
dynamic models are  required for a detailed analysis of exit decisions given the irrever-
sibility of asset dissolution.a
One important extension to the comparative statics of equilibrium output
in response to trade liberalization involves imported intermediate inputs.  Typically,
products which are used as inputs by a given industry are liberalized simultaneously
with the lowering of trade barriers on the final good itself.  This positive supply shock
on the input side should be included in an assessment of the impact of trade  liberaliza-
tion on a particular industry.  The simplest way to include concurrent liberalization of
intermediate inputs is to consider the change in cost as reducing variable input costs
uniformly across all firms within a given industry.Wi If the liberalization of imported
inputs lowers costs, then the effect on firm output of adding such a term is an expan-
sionary one.  Importantly, the magnitude of the cost reduction effect also in general
depends on firm size.  To the extent that small firms are big users of inputs per unit of
output, the percentage drop in their costs will be more substantial than for big firms.
Therefore, the addition of the cost reducing effect from the liberalization of imported
inputs attenuates  the predicted firm adjustment - firm size relationship in equation (7):
13/  See Dixit (1989) for a careful theoretical treatment of optimal inertia in invest-
ment decisions under uncertainty.  When the output price follows a random
walk, the exit trigger price is less than the variable cost minus the interest on
the exit cost; the entry trigger price correspondingly  exceeds variable cost.  This
band around the predictions of a static model suggests a forward-looking
perspective on the variance of cost and demand as they affect firm profitability.
However, lacking such proxies in the  Moroccan data, this industry-specific  noise
is absorbed into industry dummies or the error term.
LA/  In practice, different firms within an industry may rely on imported inputs to
different degrees.  The inclusion of data on changes in firm average unit cost, if
available, would control for these differences across firms in the empirical
implementation.* 12-
a given percentage fall in cost from the liberalization of imported inputs will have a
larger expansionary effect on smaller firms.Al However, with convex demand, small
firms are  predicted to contract more in percentage terms in response to an increase in
imports as long as the impact of the output adjustment term captured in equation  (7)
outweighs this additional liberalization effect./
While the main goal of this paper is to characterize the firm adjustment -
firm size relationship in response to an exogenous change in imports, it is interesting to
examine what the implications of the predicted pattern  of output adjustment are  for
national welfare.  Since this study focuses on the adjustment of incumbent firms to a
loosening of import quotas, the welfare comparative statics will not consider the
additional effects introduced frorA  simultaneous economy-wide shocks.  Let welfare
from economic activity in industry j, W,, be defined as the sum of consumers' surplus,
producers' surplus and quota rents.  Consumers' gross benefits are  captured by the
Qj+MJ  M
total area under the demand curve, B(Q,+Mj) - fo  p;(z)dz, so that:
Wj =  [B(Qi+Mj)  - (Qj+Mj).p'(Qj+Mj)]  +  ;,  ff')(%,Q 1 j,Mj)  +  (pj-p,)M.  (8)
where the existing quota protection has created a wedge between the world price p;0j
and the resulting higher domestic price p.  Since the marginal gross benefits of output
changes B' (Qj+Mj) are just measured by the prevailing domestic market price, the
welfare effect of an exogenous change in imports, ceteris paribus. is given by:
j5/  For an illustrative example of the analytics of simultaneous intermediate input
liberalization, see the appendix.
j6/  It is a plausible conjecture that small firms may be less involved in trade in their
role as importers of intermediate inputs.  Such a conjecture would strengthen
the presumption that small firms contract more, in percentage terms.  This
empirical issue will be pursued in further work.- 13 -
dWj= -(Qj+M,)*p(dQj+dM 1)  +  %[q*-p  (dQj+dMj)+(pj-Cwq)d%;]
+  (pj-p;)dMj  +  Mj  p' (dQj+dMj)  (9)
The first term represents the effect on consumers' surplus of the price change from
increased imports (and the aregate  output change in response to the import change);
the  next bracketted terms are the effect on profits, while the last two terms are the
effect on quota rents (dp; =0  under the small country assumption).  The profit effect is
decomposed into a direct price effect (the pre-reform output multiplied by the price
change) and a firm output adjustment effect (markups multiplied by firm output
changes).  This expression is very general and holds for any theory of oligopoly be-
havior.
While the first two terms and the last term  in equation (9) offset each
other, it is the third term, the adjustment of output across firms, that is the focus of
this study.  Note that the first term represents the positive impact on welfare as the
domestic price falls in response to increased imports.  However, this effect is a transfer
to consumers from firms and from holders of quota rents (who both  receive a lower
domestic price).  The other  remaining term represents the gain in quota rents from
allowing additional imports to enter  the country.  By substituting equations (2) and (6)
into (9) to re-express the firm output adjustment term, the welfare effect can be re-
written as:
dWj =  p'  *z,(q.Lx)  *  dM,  +  (p%-p*)dMj  (10)
1+tj
The first term, the output adjustment term, which is identically -p' *34)dq#, can be
decomposed into an aggregate output effect and a distribution of output effect.  Given- 14 -
that z,q#jdq 1# can be re-expressed E/ as HJQjdQj  +  V/2Qj 2dHj (where the domestic in-
dustry's Herfindahl index, Hj - ;(q%I/Qj) 2), the effect of additional imports on welfare
becomes:
dW=-  p,R4g  [Q.  M. +  '/2H  4  +  (p-p;)  (11)
dMj  Ml  dM, Qj  dMj Hj
The first term within the square brackets, the responsiveness of aggregate output to the
import change, is negative;  less domestic production, with lower domestic profits, is
socially  harmful to  the extent that profits are socially  desirable.  However, an increase
in concentration as a result of additional imports is positive for welfare, as highlighted
by the second term within the square brackets.  Though the fall in aggregate domestic
output puts downward pressure on profits and welfare, a re-distnbution of domestic
output from smaller, less cost efficient firms to large-r  more efficient firms would be
welfare-improving.d/ To see whether concentration increases with imports, note that
dHj  =  z,  - ci.(,Q.)]
Q,  (dQj)
=  2.zj[(sjj 1 j)*(vjqj - ajjQj)]  dMj  (12)
where vj  (1+Aj)/(Aj 2dMi2) >  0 is constant across firms and sij again refers to firm
market share.  The sum of the terms in square brackets will be positive if xii  is
E7/  For a detailed derivation, see Farrell and Shapiro (1990a).  Basically,  E%dq, =
1/2d[Eq,-2]  =  1/ 2d[Q42Hj]  =  HjQOdQj +  1/2Q0 2dHj.
i8/  This general result under oligopoly with uneven short-run technologies has been
noted in Lahiri and Ono (1988) and Farrell and Shapiro (1990a,b): national
welfare will increase if a firm with a sufficiently  low share is removed from the
market despite the attendant increase in concentration.  A similar effect occurs
in the licensing model of Katz and Shapiro (1985).- 15  -
decreasing in qnj,  the same condition encountered earlier in the  firm output adjustment
analysis.
m.  Data
The empirical analysis is based primarily on firm-level data  collected by
Morocco's Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the years 1984 and  1987. The
database contains the results of an exhaustive survey of all manufacturing firms employ-
ing 10 or more workers, as well as firms with less than 10 workers but with total sales
revenues exceeding 100,000 DH (roughly U$10,000 at the average 1984-87  official
exchange rate).  The annual survey contains standard statistics at the firm level by main
"activity' (1 observation per firm, where firms are classified according to a 4-digit
Moroccan industrial nomenclature), including total sales revenue, value of production,
total wage bill and year of creation.  However, for 1984 (at the onset of the trade
liberalization) and for 1987 (four years into the program), the survey also contains
much mort  disaggregated firm-level data by "product" (up to 6 observations per firm
depending on  the number of products produced by each firm, where the 4-digit codes
are broken down further to  a 6-digit level).  This more detailed data includes value of
production, quantity produced and capacity ("realizable",  in quantity terms).  Employ-
ment data are not available at this level of disaggregation.  Consequently, this study
uses production values as a measure of firm size, and changes in production values
(deflated) as a measure of firm adjustment.  Since the analysis focuses on firm output
adjustment, I limit the empirical analysis to these two years.  The level of aggregation
chosen is the 5-digit level of the Moroccan industrial nomenclature (referred to as
"product-groups" in the Moroccan nomenclature, and henceforth referred to as
"industries"); this level was chosen due to sometimes inconsistent reporting practices for
the same firm across different 6-digit products within the same 5-digit "industry".- 16-
Data on import values and degree of quota  protection were collected and
matched to the  industrial nomenclature at the same level of disaggregation.L9 Import
data only cover one of the three  import regimes in Morocco, namely goods imported
directly for domestic use.  However, the main impact of trade liberalization policies
must be reflected in these numbers, since goods imported under the temporary admis-
sion regime (inputs for both direct and indirect exports) benefitted from a free-trade
status both preceding the trade reforms and throughout the  liberalization period, while
goods imported under the industrial investment codes (specific capital goods) were
exempt from customs duties.  There  is furthermore no evidence of major shifts in
goods between import regimesAQ'  The "degree of quota  protection" variable sum-
marizes whether the products contained within a given industry are either in list A
(freely importable) or under some quantitative restriction (in list B - importable under
authorization (license) or in list C - prohibited); there  are unfortunately no data
available on the actual size of quota per product.  For each of the  two years, the quota
variable records the share of 6-digit BTN codes within a given industry that are under
a controlled list (lists B or C).  In practice, the correlation between a loosening of
quotas as captured by this quota variable and a corresponding increase in imports is
not as strong as one would expect since it is commonplace for a larger or smaller
number of import licenses to be granted with no corresponding movement between
quota lists.
.12/  Since a complete trade data set from Morocco was not available, data  used as
an input to a World Bank study (1987a) were used.  Trade data for 1987 at this
level of disaggregation were rot  available, so 1986 data were used.  Data for
1986, however, seem to be a good instrument for 1987 since at a more
aggregate level (at the 3-digit "sub-sector" level), 1987 figures are very similar to
1986 figures; according to these aggregate figures, the largest changes in imports
occured between i984 and 1986.
ZO/  See ibid., Vol. III, Annex IV, p. 11.- 17 -
The study examines the behavior of firms in industries dominated by
private ownership and not subject to heavy government price regulation.W  Further-
more, the sample under consideration is restricted to  industries that are "domestic-
oriented", that is, where exports account for less than 10 percent of production.W
Since the study attempts to determine the variables affecting adjustment of incumbent
firms within particular industries, industries that disappeared entirely from the data set
between 1984 and 1987, and those that appeared only after  1984 are excluded.
Industries where the real value of imports actually fell between 1984 and 1987 were
excluded, except where import quotas were concurrently tightened.  Finally, since the
study focuses on firm size as an important determinant of adjustment, single-firm
industries and industries where the entire population of incumbents exits are  also
excluded.W The sample under study therefore consists of 82 5-digit industries.  There
were 741 firms operating in these 82 industries in 1984. Since over 40 percent of these
firms are  multi-product (producing output in more than 1 industry in the full data set),
the number of these "firm-industry"  observations is higher (if a given firm produces
positive output in 3 industries, it is counted 3 times here).  There were 895 firm-
industry observations in the 82-industry sample in 1984.
L1  Due to limits of data availability,  the relevant industries satisfying this and the
following  criteria were chosen based on the more aggregated 3-digit sub-sector
classification. Sub-sectors with more than 50 percent state ownership or subject
to major government price regulation include fertilizer, pulp and paper,  sugar,
tobacco, edible oils, grain processing, bakeries, milk, animal feed, cement and
chemicals. See World Bank (1987b), p. 63.
2/  The impact of trade  liberalization is expected to be very different in export-
oriented sectors that benefit from temporary admission schemes (duty-free
import of all inputs, with no license required for imports otherwise subject to
quota or prohibited).  While this paper  focuses on the adjustment of import-
competing industries, the next project envisioned is to examine the adjustment of
exporting industries in response to the array of export-promotion policies
implemented.
22/  A separate study on the response of single-firm industries to trade  liberalization
is another  project for future work.- 18 -
Some summary stat.stics on relevant firm and industry variablec  ire
reported  in Table  1.  The statistics include total number of observations in the sample
under consideration for each variable, as well as the sample mean and quartiles for
each variable.  All percentage change production and import figures are expressed in
real terms, with 1987 values deflated by 2-digit sectoral deflators for domestic produc-
tion values, and by 3-digit sub-sectoral deflators for import values.  The industries
under consideration are  chlaracterized  by increasing imports, with the median industry
corresponding to a roughly 80 percent real increase over the  1984 import level (a  few
instances exist where products were moved from the freely importable list A to a more
restricted list requiring licenses).  While the aggregate domestic value of production
declined in real terms for more than half of the industries, the remaining industries
expanded domestic production.  This effect can no doubt in part be attributed  to the
liberalization of imported inputs into some of these industries, though the  available
data does not allow this effect to be isolated.  The exit share variable captures the
value of 1984 domestic production in each industry accounted for by exiting firms
(firms that are no longer recorded in a particular industry in the  1987 data set); the
entry share variable, on the other hand, captures the value of production accounted for
by new entry between 1984 and 1987, as a fraction of 1984 production.  At the median,
slightly less than 40 percent of the value of 1984 industry output exited the industry by
1987; concurrently, new entrants'  production at the median accounted for slightly less
than 20 percent of the value of 1984 industry output.  The remaining industry statistics
reflect the concentrated structure of most industries in the sample.  The median
industry in 1984 consists of 7 firms and exhibits an increase in concentration between
1984 and 1987, as measured by changes in the Herfindahl index as well as by changes
in the 1-firm concentration index (the percentage of total industry sales constituted by
the largest firm in each year).- 19-
Firm summary statistics are  reported in the second half of Table 1.  The
firm adjustment variable (Ainq#j  =  ln(q87i,/q84#>)),  representing percentage adjustment in
real value of production by firm i in industry j is clearly only available for surviving
firms.  Firms below the 25th percentile are very small, as measured both by firm share
as well as by firm employment.  One quarter  of firms in the sample hire between 1
and  10 employees, a second quarter  hire between 10 ind 25 employees, a third quarter
between 25 and 70 employees, and the largest firm hires roughly 1400 employees.  The
firm age variable classifies firms into 5 groups of roughly equal number according to
their reported year of creation: 1 represents the youngest firms (with year of creation
between 1981 and  1984), 2 represents firms that have operated  in some product-line
for between 4 and 7 years, 3 represents firms that are between 8 and  13 years old, and
4 and 5 capture the older firms.
IV.  Statistical Framework and Empircal  Results
The empirical work focuses specifically  on the distribution of output
adjustment of incumbent firms to changes in imports following  a trade liberalization
episode.  In particular, the obje  ive is to examine how percentage changes in firm
production depend on percentage changes in imports, and whether the adjustment is
more pronounced for smaller or  larger firms.  The theoretical model in this paper, with
cost differences explaining size differences, predicts that firms will contract in response
to an increase in imports (the expression multiplying  dM/M in equation (7) is negative
for all firms); with convex demand and larger firms characterized by a lower efficiency
parameter e and/or a larger quantity of sunk assets K, the model predicts that small
firms will contract more in percentage terms than larger firms.  Under such conditions,
a shift in resources from smaller to larger, more cost efficient firms would be welfare-
improving.- 20 -
The proportional adjustment equation, equation (7) forms the basis of the
empirical estimation.  It expresses the percentage change in firm output in response to
a percentage change in imports as a function of firm share.  The additional effect of
simultaneous intermediate input liberalization will also be controlled for.  By replacing
the infinitessimal percentage changes in equation (7) with changes in logs, the import-
related firm output relationship can be expressed as:
Alnq#  =  f(SH84ij,  aInMj, a; &AC#)  (13)
where Alnq 1 represents percentage adjustment in real value of production by firm i in
industry j, AInMj  represents percentage real import adjustment in industry j, and SH84 1j
represents firm i's pre-reform share of aggregate domestic production value for industry
j.  In addition, a variable that represents the clange  in firm i's average cost between
1984 and 1987 in the  production of "product" j, AAC,#,  should be included to  capture
the potential expansionary effect on output of lowtr-cost liberalized inputs.  However,
while the Moroccan industrial data set has very detailed production figures for 1984
and 1987, it contains very little cost data, and no data on material input costs.  To the
extent that firms in closely-related industries use a roughly similar basket of imported
inputs, the cost impact of input liberalization will vary systematically  across broad
groupings of industries.  To capture these sectoral fixed effects, sector-specific inter-
cepts were included at progressively finer levels of disaggregation (from the 2-digit
"sector" level to the 4-digit "activity"  level).'  Results are  reportcd for the 2-digit
sectoral level, where the 82 industry sample is grouped into 14 sectors, since finer
levels of disaggregation result in lack of degrees of freedom due to insufficient observa-
241  While the fixed effects capture the average change in unit cost for firms within a
given sector, they also capture productivity and technology differences and
changes in markups, among other effects, to the extent that they vary across
sectors.  An input-output table of the Moroccan economy, when available, will
permit a more careful grouping of industries along input-use lines.- 21 -
tions for many groupings.  Although inclusion of sectoral fixed effects is an imperfect
way to control for the change in cost due to the concurrent liberalization of inter-
mediate inputs, it is the only method available to control for such an effect given the
paucity of cost data for 1984.  Results including these secoral  fixed effects will be
reported  in the appendix.
The hypotheses to be tested are whether firm adjustment is sensitive to
imports in the  expected direction, and whether the distribution of firm output adjust-
ment follows the predicted pattern.  The theoretical model presented in this paper
suggests that the larger the percentage increase in imports, the more significant the
percentage contraction in firm output, on average.  Importantly, for convex demand,
smaller firms are expected to contract more in percentage terms than larger firms, on
average.  To test these two hypotheses, the functional relationship in equation (13) can
be estimated by regressing MInq#j  on MlnMj  and on alnMj interacted with SH84ij. For
convex demand, the theoretical model predicts a negative relation between Alnq%  and
A1nMj  which is less negative the larger the firm: the model therefore predicts a negative
coefficient on AlnM,  but a positive coefficient on percentage change in imports inter-
acted with firm share.  While a regression with these two right-hand side variables
captures the link between import-related firm output adjustment and firm size, it does
not isolate tne particular import-related effect from other economy-wide effects that
may have an important impact on firm adjustment.
It is important to include additional variables in a more general regression
equation to control for industry-specific  and economy-wic  z effects.  The form of the
estimation equation (adjustment eguation) that will be. the focus of discussion therefore
is:
Ain%=  Po +  ,A]nM, +  A 2(SH84ij.AnMM)  +  P3(H84j,&MnMj)  +  ,SH84ij  + 05Fh + (14)
= Bo  + (B, +  2SH84ij +  P3H84,).M1nM,  +  04SH84ij +  65Fh +  eij- 22  -
The newly-introduced  variables include the non-interacted firm size variable (to control
for economy-wide effects that may affect the firm output adjustment - firm size
relationship),  rInMj  interacted with H84j where H84j represents industry j's  Herfindahl
index (to control for indust.y-specif£c  effects, as explained below), and Fh which
represents a vector of sectoral dummies (to control for changes in cost from input
liberalization across sectors, where h indexes the 14 sectors in the sample).  The
appendix contains results for different alternate specifications.
It seems most natural to estimate a separate  relationship for each in-
dustry.  However, lack of degrees of freedom due to insufficient observations for
industries with few firms, and the attendant selection bias introduced by examining only
industries with many firms suggests pooling the data across industries while controlling
for industry effects.  One effect that could only be captured in a cross-section is the
impact of capital market conditions that cut across industries on the investment decisio-
ns of high versus low efficiency firms.  The results to be discussed reflect the estimation
of equation (14) across all industries.  Ir. order to judge where coefficients should be
allowed to vary across industries and where it may be more efficient to estimate a
single coefficient across all industries, a series of F tests were perforr.: d on the various
combinations of intercept industry dummies and slope industry dummies for the first
two right-hand side variables.  The hypothesis that all industry coefficients are jointly
insignificant  could not be rejected in any of these cases.  The implication is that
pooling the data and estimating one set of coefficients across industries may not be
inappropriate.  In order to allow the coefficient on &InM,  to vary across industries (in
addition to the variatiorn  across firms captured by the interaction term between firm
share and A1nMj),  the impact of including one of the few additional available variables
that varies across industries, the industry-specific  Herfindahl index, was examined.
Inclusion of such an industry-specific  variable reflects a compromise between including- 23 -
separate slope dummies for each industry and constraining the coefficient to be the
same across all industries.
A possibly important statistical issue that arises in estimating equation
(14) concerns sample censoring.  Firm ouitput adjustment, here defined as the  logarith-
mic change in real production value, can only be calculated for firms that did not exit
from the database between 1984 and 1987.  Since there exist a substantial number of
observations for the independent variables that correspond to a dependent variable that
is not observable, the sample is said to be censored.  A qualitative firm survival
variable, S, is coded as 1 if firm i in industry j is in the  data set in both  1984 and 1987,
and as 0 if the firm was in the data set in 1984 but not in 1987. Out of the total 895
firm-industry pairs operating in 1984, 52 percent of them exited from a given industry
at some time over the 4 years (recall that under this calculation, a given firm exiting
from three different industries is recorded as three  exits); total exits accounted for a
loss of 38 percent of the total  1984 production value in these industries.?J  When
interpreting these figures, it is important to realize that they describe movement out of
the database.  Th'erefore, a firm with total sales revenue below 100,000  DH where
employment falls below 10 workers may be dropped from the survey.  A firm switching
from one industry to a second one appears as ani exit fromn  the first.  In addition to
voluntary dissolution, exiting firms may have been acquired by other firms, may have
merged with other  firms, or finally may have been assigned a new firm identification
{/  These figures seem high when compared to other empirical evidence on firm
exit.  In a Wisconsin industrial panel, 45 percent of firms active in 1978 exited
over the subsequent 8 year period (see Pakes and Ericson, Table 1).  In Chile
over the  period 1977-85.  21.6 percent of new plants exit, on average, within one
year.  The percentage of exits decrease as the plants age, stabilizing at
approximately a 13 percent exit rate per year for plants that are more than 3
years old (see Roberts, pp. 21-2).  However, it is important to note that in
contrast to other studies, the sample of industries under consideration here is
restricted to import-competing industries characterized by substantial increases in
imports over the given four-year period.- 24 -
code due to recording error or may have been assigned a different product code due to
inconsistent reporting practices or recording error.L/
The following  framework is used to illustrate the potential source of bias
from estimating equation (14) on the censored sample, and to  motivate the chosen
estimation method that controls for this sample selection bias.  It is a standard
generalized Tobit model.  The dependent variable alnqj  is observed, in the sense that
data  is available from a give- firm in both the beginning and ending period, only if
another set of observable variables Zij together with a random component vij exceed a
threshold c; as mentionned in the preceding paragraph, let S#=1 when Alnq#  is ob-
served, and S =0 when it is unobserved.  Observed data is generated according to the
following  decision rule, where vi; and e# are assumed to have a ti'iariate  normal
distribution with zero means, variances a,2 and a.2, and correlation pv.:
Atlnq# =  Xvj  +  fj  if Zijs + iij ? c  (survival; S,j=1)
&lnq#; not observed  if ZO  + mij  < c  (exit; Sjj=O)  (15)
If the observations for which Zjj6 + vij < c are ignored, the I 'ast squares estimators
will be biased and inconsistent.  To see this, note that while Eei  =  0 is assumed to be
true for the population at large, this may not hold for the observed (censored) sub-
sample.  In particular, note that the expectation of observed values of Alnq 1, conditional
on Z,#6  + vaj  ? c is:
E(alnlqj  I Z#jS  +  Vjj 2  C)  =  #o  +  E(e;; I  Z#6 +  V#  a c)
=  +  E(ej;  I  Vij >  C - Z#6)
=  xg  +  Pjao,Aij  (16)
16  A careful examination of the data revealed a considerable number of cases of
this last source of measurement error for a given firm across different 6 digit
products within the  same 5-digit level of aggregation.  This was the main reason
for choosing to work at the 5-digit level of aggregation.- 25 -
where the conditional expectation of the error term varies with X#.LZ/  Note that this
conditional expectation is equivalently pvzopip  where pij is the inverse Mills' ratio (also
known as the hazard rate in reliability theory), which is the ratio of the  density to the
cumulative distribution of a standard normal random variable evaluated at Z;a,,6.
Ordinary least squares estimation of equation (14), ignoring the censored sample
problem, omits the second term on the right-hand side of equation (16).  The condi-
tional expectation of the error term, p,,UgPjj can be interpreted as an omitted variable
in the specification of the original adjustment equation (14).  To correct for this sample
selection bias, Heckman's (1976) two-step estimation method is used.A'  The first step
is to estimate a probit model (a survival equation) where the qualitative cependent
variable (S,, is 1 or zero depending on whether &lnq#L  is observed or not) is regressed
on the observed Z's; this provides a consistent estimator for  ij,. The estimation of this
survival equation is of course informative in its own right.  The second step then
consists of estimating the adjustment equation (14) on the censored sample, where the
information from the survival equation is now included to correct for the sample
selection bias.  In this application, the variables in the survival equation (the Z's) and
in the adjustment equation (the X's) are the same; absent certain financial firm
variables (which are  not available in the present Moroccan data set), it is not clear
which real-side vanable might explain the exit decision but not the surviving firms'
adjustment decision.
The main estimation results are reported in Table 2.  Results of the
survival (probit) regression and the adjustment equation correcting for sample selection
Z2/  See Griliches, Hall and Hausman (1978), pp. 144-5 for the detailed link between
the second and third equations.
2/  For a careful exposition, see Amemiya (1985), pp. 368-72 and Maddala (1983),
pp. 231-4, and for recent applications to the firm growth-size relationship, see
Evans (1987a,b) and Hall (1987).- 26 -
bias are reported in the  first four columns.  The estimated coefficient on the inverse
Mills' ratio is positive and significantly  different from zero.r'  The implication is that
the disturbances of the survival and adjustment equations are positively correlated.
The coefficients are  therefore expected to be biased absent an appropriate  correction.
The corrected adjustment equation should, in principle, form the basis of the analysis.
While the corrected adjustment equation exhibits multicollinearity,M'  the estimates do
not seem too imprecise.  The results of a second series of ordinary least squares
regressions that were run on the adjustment equation are  reported in the last two
columns of Tables 2.  This time, selection bias was not corrected for to  avoid potential
identification problems.
*  Discussion of results will proceed by first examining the  estimates from
the survival equation followed by an examination of the estimates from the adjustment
equation; a subsequent paragraph summarizes the combination of exit and survivor
adjustment effects at work.  The estimates from the survival equation, columns 1 and 2
of Table 2 show that the probability of survival falls with imports, as predicted.  When
focusing exclusively  on the relation between survival and import change (Table 2,
column 1), the coefficient on import change is negative and significant;  the  negative
coefficient on import change together with the coefficient on the crossproduct of firm
22/  The estimated coefficient on the inverse Mills' ratio is also significantly  different
from zero in all cases reported in the appendix except in the case where the  13
sectoral dummy variables are included; in this case, all estimates are measured
with much less precision.
1Q/  Collinearity diagnostics, including an examination of the eigenvalues of the first
moments matrix and the principal components of estimate variances, highlight
that the inverse Mills' ratio, u, is highly collinear with other regressors, in
particular the constant term.  Basically,  there is a potential identification
problem.  Since the variables in the survival and adjustment equations are the
same (no appropriate instrument comes to mind), identification of the para-
meters in the adjustment equation comes only from the nonlinearity of the Mills'
ratio term.- 27 -
share and import change imply that at the sample mean, a 1 percent increase in
imports results in a .12 percent fall in the probability of survival.  In industries with a
larger percentage change in imports, the probability of exit is higher on average.  The
significant positive coefficient on firm share interacted with exit, on the other hand,
implies that for a given increase in imports, larger fu-ms have a higher probability of
survival.  With respect to  the survival-exit  decision, small firms appear  to bear the
brunt of adjustment and exit in greater numbers.W
Importantly, the flavor of results is also robust to the inclusion of controls
for the underlying firm adjustment - firm size relationship that is independent of the
import change (due  to economy-wide  shocks, for instance) (Table 2, column 2).  Non-
interacted firm size (firm share) positively affects the survival-exit  decision:  larger firms
have a higher probability of survival.  While firm share interacted with imports is no
longer a significant separate determinant of exit when adding these control variables,
firms in industries with larger increases in imports still have a  higher probability of exit.
However, when total  employment is used to control for the general firm size effect
(appendix, Table A-3, columns 1 and 2), the probability of exit in response to the
loosening of quotas is once again signficantly  higher for smaller firms.A'
An examination of the results from the estimation of adjustment equa-
tions will focus on the equation that corrects for sample selection bias (columns 3 and
4 in Table 2), since the disturbances of the survival and adjustment equations are
Ll/  These results are robust to the inclusion of sector dummy variables (see the
appendix, Table A-1, column 2); the coefficients  on import change and import
change interacted with firm share are not very sensitive to whether sector
dummies are included.
22/  Total employment as a measure of firm size is a much less significant indepen-
dent determinant of firm survival than firm share.  This may be due largely to
the fact that this variable is not disaggregated according to the different in-
dustries in which a given firm operates in.- 28-
strongly positively correlated; the estimates with and without the sample selection
correction are quite different in value.  When focusing exclusively  on the impact of
imports on adjustment (Table 2, column 3), industries with larger increases in imports
are characterized by firms with larger percentage contractions of firm output, on
average.  The significant negative coefficient on import change, together with the
coefficient on the interaction term of import change with firm share evaluated at the
sample mean implies that a  1 percent increase in imports results in a 1.51 percent
contraction in firm output, on average.  Importantly, surviving  small firms also contract
,ore in percentage terms than remaining large firms: the coefficient on firm share
inLeracted  with import change is significantly  positive.A
On the other hand, the results from surviving  firm adjustment seem more
robust to the inclusion of controls for non-import-related size effects (Table 2, column
4) than the results for survival-exit. Size is a significant independent determinant of
adjustment: larger firms contract less in percentage terms than smaller firms.  Impor-
tantly, controlling for this general size effect, adjustment of firms is still significantly
sensitive to import changes in the expected direction, with smaller firms contracting
more in percentage terms than larger firms in response to the increase in imports.  As
in the survival cquations, the impact of firm size on import-related adjustment (as
2/  The results on adjustment of surviving  firms are less robust to the inclusion of
sector dummy variables (appendix, Table A-1, column 4) than the results on
survival-exit. This is no doubt in part because the sample is one-half as large as
that for the survival equation, so the addition of these dummies leads to less
precise estimates; the coefficient on import change and import change interacted
with firm share are  much smaller in size once these dummies are  included and
intra-sector variation is controlled for.  The only variation from imports now
arises from inter-industry variation within a given sector rather than from
variation across sectors.- 29 -
captured by the interaction term between imports and firm size) is much stronger when
the employment measure of size is used as a control.W
The empirical evidence on within-industry resouice shifts following  trade
lberaIization presented here suggests that two apparently reinforcing effects are at
work.  These results are consistent with the implications of the  theoretical framework
presented in Section II.  First, the significantly  more pronounced exit of smaller firms
(from the probit equation) suggests that resources may be shifting from small firms to
larger incumbent firms in the industry or to other growing sectors of the economy.  To
be able to make a clear inference regarding underlying resource shifts, however, it is
important also to examine the behavior of entrants.W' The second effect at work is the
more pronounced contraction of small surviving firms relative to larger firms, which
may augment any resource shift from small to larger firms.  Here, the crucial question
is whether a more pronounced contraction in percentage terms for smaller firms
actually translates into a transfer in levels of resources from small to larger firms.
The implication for welfare of the direction of within-industry  resource
shifts following trade reform depends on the relationship between firm size and cost
efficiency. If, as the theoretica; framework suggests, large firms are more cost efficient,
then an argregate  shift of resources from smaller to larger firms is welfare-improving.
An errpirical estimate of this size-cost relationship is therefore very relevant to the
weluare implications of firm output adjustment.  Given limited data availability  (in
particular, the lack of more extensive input cost data), a natural relationship to
estimate is that between firm size and firm average variable cost.  Firm average
i4/  See the appendix, Table A-3, columns 3 and 4.
&/  This is the subject of current work.- 30 -
variable cost is here proxied by the firm's wage bill as a fraction of the firm's quantity
produced.A  To the extent that firms within the same finely-disaggregated  6-digit
classification produce goods of similar quality but with different price structures
(different markups due to local market power), it is preferable to deflate the firm's
wage bill by physical units.  Since it is not possible to allocate a given firm's wage bill
to its constituent products, it is appropriate to restrict the  --alysis to that sub-sample of
firms where revenues from a single 6-digit product constitute a preponderant  share of
total firm revenues.  For those firms, the equation I estimate is:
a84j - mq84  =  o  (AC84, - mAC84  ) +  Eij  (17)
mq84j  mAC84j
where q84ij  is firm i's 1984 physical quantity produced in the 6-digit product line j,
AC84 5 is, as mentionned above, firm i's wage bill divided by firm i's quantity produced,
and m-prefixes denote product-line mean values.
The natural relationship I wish to  estimate is that between firm size and
firm average cost in each product-line, normalizing by product-line means since I
estimate one relationship across all industries in addition to estimating the relationship
on a product-line by product-line basis.  However, there  is only one free parameter  to
estimate in such a regression of values relative to mean against other values relative to
their mean.  A re-expression of that relationship yields equation (17).  The highly
significant negative estimated coefficient in a regression run across product-lines
suggests that larger than average firms in a particular product-line tend to have lower
than average costs in that product-line.0Z While it seems more appropriate  to estimate
h/  Such a proxy is more appropriate the  more likely it is that the firm's labor costs
are  proportional to total variable costs.
2/  Equation (17) is estimated on 343 firm-product observations, which includes 76
distinct product-lines (where the given product's revenues accounts for at least- 31 -
such a relation on a product-line by product-line basis, many product-lines withiin  the  76
product-line sub-sample consist of 2, 3 or 4 firms.&' To estimate a relation on a
product-line by product-line basis, a further reduced sub-sample was examined where
each product-line consisted of at least 9 firms (this sample consists unfortunately of
only 9 product-lines).  Product-line results from this 113 observation sub-sample are
reported  in Table 3.  All product-line coefficients are negative, and two are significantly
different from zero (one at the 1.5% level, the other at the 6.5% level).  Although an
inference from this result to a positive size-efficiency  relationship must be tentative,
these findings represent suggestive evidence that larger firms are more efficient, on
average.w/
V.  Conclusions
Over the period 1984 to  1987, a major liberalization of restrictive trade
policies was implemented in the Moroccan manufacturing sector.  The level of imports
changed across different industries according to  each industry's degree of liberalization.
Such a trade liberalization (shocks exogenous to individual firms) provides a natural
experiment that permits the testing of specific theories of firm output adjustment both
across the different firms within a given industry and across industries.  In addition, the
relative output adjustment of individual firms within a given industry in response to
these shocks provides evidence of the underlying shift in resources occuring across
firms.  Such shifts in resources within an industry may in turn represent  an additional
90 percent of total firm revenues).  The parameter  estimate on the firm relative
cost variable is -.376, with a standard error of .066.
/  8j  An F test performed on this 76 product-line sample does not allow rejection of
the hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly insignificant.
22/  Future work will examine the firm size - cost efficiency relationship in greater
detail.- 32 -
source of welfare gain to the economy from trade  liberalization if resources shift from
relativeil less cost efficient firms to more efficient ones.
The main focus of this paper  has been on exploring the distribution of
output adjustment among incumbent firms to the changes in imports following a
particular trade  liberalization episode.  A domestic oligopoly model where competing
firms are not equally efficient, with perfectly substitutable imports fixed at some
exogenous pre-reform level, provides the theoretical framework for the study.  A higher
level of imports as the trade  restrictions are relaxed then shifts the residual demand
facing domestic suppliers.  Such a model predicts that firm output contraction will be
larger the greater  the increase in imports.  Among other factors, the model predicts
that each firm's output adjustment will depend on its pre-reform equilibrium output.
Firm output; in this context, serves as a proxy for firm cost; within such an oligopoly
model, firms with lower marginal cost have larger equilibrium output levels.  Whether
smailer firms contract more than larger firms depends on the slope and curvature of
demand and cost functions, and the firm's conjectural variation parameter.  The
analytics suggest that, given convex demand, small firms will contract more than larger
firms, in percentage terms.
The empirical evidence supports the postulated link between imports and
adjustment, and importantly, the link between import-related firm output adjustment
and firm size.  On average, firm contraction is more pronounced the larger the increase
in imports.  There appears to be a significant negative relationship between import-
related firm adjustment and firm size.  Focusing first on the exit decision, it is found
that the probability of exit in response to an increase in imports is significantly  larger
among small firms than among large firms.  When examining the behavior of survivors,
small firms contract more in percentage terms than remaining larger firms.  These
results suggest that small firms are  more likely to bear the brunt of any aggregate
output contraction in response to  an increase in imports.  Such a finding, together with* 33 -
the suggested positive firm size - firm efficiency relationship in the data, supports the
view that trade  liberalization may well result in welfare-improving  output re-adjust-
ments.
The results of this paper represent a first step in the analysis of firm
adjustment to trade liberalization.  Though it appears that, on average, small firms
contract more in percentage terms than larger firms in response to a given increase in
imports, the impact on welfare of output re-adjustments between firms depends on the
aggregate level of resource shifts within particular industries.  While the paper  shows
that output in small firms contracts more than output in large firms, it presents no
evidence of a shift of production from small to large firms.  Current work in progress
is directed at the calculation of the most meaningful summary statistics for the change
in the level of resources underlying the percentage changes in adjustment, taking the
estimated parameters  into account.  One additional element to a full understanding of
the direction of resource shifts following trade liberalization is a careful examination of
entry behavior.  It is clearly relevant whether entering firms, on average, have lower
average costs than exiting firms or not.  While the econometric specification posited in
this paper controlled for certain industry specific effects, alternative spec; ications to
control for and to estimate varying properties of industry demand across industries can
be estimated.  The assumption of perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign
production, and between domestic output of different firms within the same 5-digit
industry can be relaxed in industries where the variance in unit values across firm
outputs within a given industry is large.  Additional insights are  likely to emerge soon
from ongoing work in these areas.  As mentioned, the detailed analysis of single-firm
industries in response to import liberalization, and the. analysis of export-oriented
industries, are productive areas for future work.- 34 -
Table 1
Summary Statistics: (a) Industry variables
(standard errors in parentheses)
Variable  Total No. Obs.  Mean  Lower Quartile  Median  Upper
Quartile
%  Ind. Imports  82  1.091  .136  .605  1.822
(AInM 1=ln(M87/M84>))  (.131)
%a Ind. Production  82  .016  -.551  -.031  .406
(AlnQj=ln(Q87,/Q84j))  (.099)
Exit Share  82  .377  .061  .374  .640
(ss.Oq84sj/Q84j)  (.033)
Entry Share  82  .644  .054  .182  .561
(zq 87
1 .. Q84r)  (.196)
No. Firms 84  82  10.915  4  7  14
(1.299)
Herfindahl 84  82  .346  .187  .294  .501
(z 1(q84jj!Q84 1)2)  (.021)
%&  Herfindahl  82  .192  -.187  .057  .399
((H87j-H84j)/H84j)  (.066)
1-Firm Conc.84  82  .454  .302  .405  .579
(q84&/Q84j)
%a 1-Firm Conc.  82  .190  -.163  .089  .448
((CR87j-CR84j)/CR84,)  (.056)- 35 -
Table 1
Summgar Statistics: (b) Firm variables
(standard errors in parentheses)
Variable  Total No. Obs.  Mean  Lower Quartile  Median  Upper  Quartile
Firm Share  895  .092  .005  .022  .109
(SH84#-q84,i/Q84)  (.005)
Firm Employment 84  741  68.00  10  24  69.5
(TL84j)  (4.60)
Firm Adjustment  429  .166  -.378  .144  .620
(lncj=  ln(q87 5/q84j;)  (.052)
Firm Age 84  741  3.059  2  3  4
(AGE 5)  (.050)- 36-
Table  2
Imoort-Related  Firm  Adjustment
(OLS  scandard  errors  in parentheses;  White's  heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard  errors  in  brackets)
Probit  Selection  Correction  Uncorrected
Survival equation1 Adjustment  equation  Adjustment  equation
(obs  - 895)  (obs  - 429)  (obs  - 429)
Maximum  Ukelihood  O.LS.  O.LS.
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Intercept  .087i  -.064  -13.487  -15.150  .239  .373
(.063)  (.076)  (4.328)  (3.508)  (.075)  (.095)
(5.1661  [3.398]  [.073]  [.099]
%a  -.175  -.104  -2.133  -1.419  -.034  -.105
Ind.Imports  (.044)  (.048)  (.664)  (.303)  (.057)  (.065)
(PERMj)  [.7911  [.300]  [.064]  (.073]
Firm  Share  *  .644  .040  6.845  1.118  -.299  .174
%aImports  (.177)  -.  45)  (2.261)  (.354)  (.204)  (.288)
(SH84i1.PERM7)  [2.742]  [.334]  [.2  31]  [.274]
Firm  Share  1.428  13.552  -.979
(SH84j)  (.406)  . (3.309)  (.423)
[3.168]  [.371]
Inverse  Mills'  ratio  18.508  18.695
(5.835)  (4.223)
[6.964]  (4.106]
Regrukiow  'abelled  by  (1) exdude  controls  for non-impon  related  size  effecu  and  industry-specirc  effects  while  those
labelled  by  (2) control  for thece  effects.- 37 -
Table 3
Firm size - Cost efflciency rqlationship
(OLS standard errors in parentheses)




153111  -.392  (.918)
203110  -.204  (.272)
203117  -.249  (.355)
203220  -.343  (.427)
257191  -3.136  (1.248)
263110  -1.121  (.598)
263210  -.273  (.460)
263440  -.181  (.279)
271110  -.438  (.455)- 38 -
References
Amemiya, Takeshi, 1985, Advanced Econometrics (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell).
Buffie, Edward F. and Pablo T. Spiller, "Trade Liberalization in Oligopolistic Industries:
The Quota Case", Journal of International Economics (20, pp. 65-81).
Dixit, Avinash, 1989, "Entry and Exit Decisions under Uncertainty", Journal of Political E-
conom  (97, pp. 620-638).
Dunne, Timothy, Mark Roberts and Larry Samuelson, 1989, "The Growth and Failure of
U.S. Manufacturing Plants", Ouarterly Journal of Economics (104, November, pp. 671-98).
Evans, David S., 1987a, 'The  Relationship between Firm Growth, Size and Age: Estimates
for 100 Manufacturing Industries", Journal of Industrial Economics (35, pp. 567-82).
1987b, 'Tests of Alternative Theories of Firm Growth", Journal of Political
Economy (95, August, pp. 657-74).
Farrell, Joseph and Carl Shapiro, 1990a, "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis",
American Economic Review (80, March, pp. 107-26).
-------- ,  1990b, "Asset Ownership and Market Structure in Oligopoly",  Rand Journal of Ec-
onomics (21, March, forthcoming).
.hemawat,  Pankaj and Barry Nalebuff, 1987, 'The  Devolution of Declining Industries", W
oodrow Wilson Discussion Paper #120  (January, Princeton University).
Griliches, Zvi, B. Hall and J. Hausman, 1978, "Missing Data and Self-Selection in Large
Panels", Annales de l'INSEE (30-31, pp. 137-76).
Hall. Bronwyn, 1987, 'The  Relationship Between Firm Size and Firm Growth in the U.S.
Manufarturing Sector", Journal of Industrial Economic  (35, pp. 583-606).
Heckman, J.J., 1976, 'The  Common Structure of Statistical Models of Truncation, Sample
Selection and Limited Dependent Variables and a Simple Estimation for Such Modeis.
Annals of Economic and Social Measurement (5, pp. 475-92).
Jovanovic, Boyan, 1982, "Selection and Evolution of Industry", Econometrica (50, May, pp.
649-70).- 39 -
Katz, Michael and Carl Shapiro, 1985, "On the Licensing of Innovations", Rand Journal of
Economics (16, pp. 504-20).
Lahiri, Sajal and Yoshiyasu Ono, 1988, "Helping Minor Firms Reduces Welfare",  v1he
'Economic Journal (98, December, pp. 1199-1202).
Lieberman, Marvin B., 1989, "Divestment in Declining Industries: Shakeout or Stakeout"
(January, Draft, Stanford University).
Maddala, G.S., 1983, Limited-Dependent and Oualitative Variables in Econometrics (Cam
brige, England: Cambridge University Press).
Pakes, Ariel and Richard Ericson, 1988, "Empirical Implications of Alternative Models of
Firm Dvnamics" (December, Draft).
Perry, Martin K. and Robert H. Porter, 1985, "Oligopoly  and the Incentive for Horizontal
Merger", American Economic Review (75, pp. 219-27).
Richardson, J. David, 1988, "Empirical Research on Trade Liberalization with Imperfect
Competition: A Survey" (October, Draft, Department of Economics, University of
Wisconsin).
Roberts, Mark J., 1989, "The Structure of Production in Colombian Manufacturing
Industries" (May, Draft, Pennsylvania State University).
Rodrik, Dani, 1988, "Closing the Technology Gap: Does Trade Liberalization Really
Help?" (May, processed, Harvard University).
Shapiro, Carl, 1989, "Theories of Oligopoly Behavior", in R. Schmalensee and R. Willig,
eds., The Handbook ot  Industrial Organization (North Holland).
Tybout, James R., 1989, "Entry, Exit, Competition and Productivity in the Chilean
Industrial Sector" (April, Draft, CECTP, The World Bank).
White, Halbert, 1980, "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent  Covaiiance Matrix Estimator and a
Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity", Econometrica (48, May, pp. 817-38).
World Bank, 1987a, "Morocco: The Impact of Liberalization on Trade and Industrial
Adjustment" (October, Report No. 6714-MOR).
World Bank, 1987b, "Morocco: Enterprise Development Study" (October, Draft).- 40 -
Aptendix
Simultaneous Intermediate Input Liberalization
Let firm i's short-run technology be summarized by the variable cost function:
C(w,q#,ejj,KY-)  =  g1(w) ejj*  [qj+?(K,j)q#I/21
where g(w) captures the  prices of variable inputs and f' < 0 so that additional capital
lowers the marginal cost curve.01 This is a special form of the general technological
representation embodied in equation (1).  Implicit in this simplified linear relationship
between variable factor prices and output is the assumption that the  ratio of variable
inputs is independent of output.  Assume that liberalization of intermediate inputs reduces
g(w) uniformly across all firms within the industry and that there  are no economy-wide
shocks.  Totally differentiating firm i's first-order condition (equation 2) where dg  <  0
and substituting in the industry output response yields:
dq,j =  _Jl  * d_1 - 0  * dge
C"qq-p  1+Al  U  qq-pj,
Given the assumed technological specification,  jqJ =  C7g  >  0 such that a
fall in the cost of imported inputs lowers marginal cost.  This effect tends to offset the
output contraction in response to the increase in final good imports; the  magnitude of the
effect (the extent to which it offsets the fall in output) clearly depends on the size of
input liberalization and the input's importance in the production process.  Importantly, the
4O/  The basic form of this variable cost function, absent the efficiency parameter
and the factor price term, has been used by Perry and Porter (1985), and more
recently by Farrell and Shapiro (1990b) to examine the effects of changes in the
ownership of productive assets in an oligopoly context.* 41 -
magnitude of the cost reduction effect also depends on firm size: in equilibrium, larger
firms have lower marginal cost, hence lower CYj,  By re-expressing the term  multiplying
de  in terms of output, in a manner similar to the derivation of equation (7)>W,  the
augmented adjustment equation becomes:
j  = [R±i  ,I)  + LjQ  ']  ax  *  M  - Ip,L  +A]  * X
'LJ  p, - gej,  1+Aj  Mi  pj - ejjg
If the liberalization of imported inputs lowers costs (such that dg/g  is
negative), then the effect of adding this second term on firm output is an expansionary
one.  The second term will be more positive for small firms: on the one hand, the
denominator is smaller in magnitude if small firms are characterized by higher e, and
concurrently, the numerator will be larger since the negative p,  term is weighted by a
smaller firm share magnitude (the numerator will always be positive).  Therefore, the
addition of the cost reducing effect from the liberalization of imported inputs attenuates
the predicted firm adjustment - firm size relationship from equation (7).
Alternative regression specifications
Different alternate  specifications  of the general estimation equation  (14) are
included in Tables A-1, A-2 and A-3.
In Table A-1, the original regression results discussed in the main text (the
impact of imports and firm size on adjustment reported in Table 2, columns 1, 3 and 5)
are  reproduced in order to compare them with results including sectoral fixed effects.  As
mentionned in the  main text, to the extent that firms in closely-related industries use a
lj  By substituting the assumed functional form for C'q in equation (2), and re-
arranging, COq/g  can be shown to equal (p+ pj, qj)/Ig.- 42 -
similar basket of inputs, sectoral dummies may control for changes in cost from input
liberalization across sectors.
Tables A-2 and A-3 report  results where both non-import-related size effects
(due to  an economy-wide shock, for instance) and industry-specific  effects (the industry-
specific Herfindahl interacted with &lnM)  are controlled for.  These two tables differ by
considering two different measures of firm size as control variables: Table A-2 reports
results where firm share is used as the control-for the size effect, while Table A-3 reports
results where total firm employment (firm i's employment of permanent and temporary
workers) is used!W. Given the imprecise nature of the. estimates when sectoral fixed
effects are  also estimated, results reported in Tables A-2 and A-3 do not include sectoral
dummies.  In each of these tables, results are  reported with and without the inclusion of
an additional firm age variable.  The motivation to control for this additional firm-specific
effect comes from several recent empirical papers examining patterns of firm growth and
failure and their relation both to firm size and firm age
42/  Most of the empirical studies cited in the  introduction of Dunne et.al. (1989)
focus on the relation between the firm or plant's size, generally measured by
employment, and the rate of growth.  The advantage of firm share data based
on production values, in the case of the Moroccan data set, is that a separate
observation can be used for each industry in which a given firm operates rather
than using the same employment number across these industries.- 43 -
Table A-1
Import-Related Firm Adjustment (without control variables)
(OLS standard errors in parentheses; White's heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors in brackets)
Probit  Selection Correction  Uncorrected
Survival eguationJ  Adjustment equation  Adjustment equation
(obs  - 895)  (obs  - 429)  (obs  - 429)
Maximum Likelihood  O.L.S.  O.LS.
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Intercept  .087  .383  -13.487  -3.204  .239  .261
(.063)  (.288)  (4.328)  (2.552)  (.075)  (.311)
[5.166]  [2.576]  [.073]  [.416]
d%Da  -.175  -.144  -2.133  -.560  -.034  .013
Ind.Imports  (.044)  (.051)  (.664)  (.423)  (.057)  (.067)
(PERM,)  [.791]  [.421]  [.064]  [.075]
Firm Share  *  .644  .549  6.845  1.603  -.299  -.406
%AoImports  (.177)  (.181)  (2.261)  (1.483)  (.204)  (.214)
(SH84ij PERMj)  [2.742]  [1.462]  [.231]  [.224]
Sectoral Fixed Effects  *  *
(Fl  - F13)
Inverse Mills' ratio  18.508  6.156
(5.835)  (4.499)
[6.964]  [4.393]
Regr_os  labelled  by (1) afdude  storal  fbed effects  while  those  labelled  by (2) control  ror  tora fhd  effetas Results
for 13  sector  dummy  vanrabks  (*) am presnted  on the  following  page;  the 14th,  sector  27,  i  reflected  in the  ianterepL44 -
Table A-1 (continued)
Import-Related Firm Adjustment (without control variables)
(OLS standard  errors in parentheses; White's heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors in brackets)
Probit  - Selection  Correction  Uncorrected
Survival equation  Adjustment equation]  Adjustment equation
(obs  - 895)  (obs  =  429)  (obs  =  429)
Maximum likelihood  O.LS.  O.LS.
Sector Dummy Variables
12  2.090  (2.138)  2.969  (2.533)  -.308  (.824)
[2.443]  [.414]
13  -.196  (.300)  -.912  (.608)  -.211  (.327)
[.610]  [.455]
15  -.217  (.352)  -.940  (.699)  -.148  (.392)
[.690]  [.495]
16  -.286  (.475)  -1.614  (.947)  -.546  (.537)
[.847]  [.499]
17  -.054  (.336)  .028  (.384)  .187  (.367)
[.455]  [.463]
18  .562  (.711)  1.621  (1.314)  .033  (.619)
[1.268]  [.775]
20  -.708  (.294)  -3.157  (2.100)  -.319  (.327)
[1.997]  [.462]
21  -.340  (.377)  -.924  (1.010)  .329  (.427)
[.904]  [.520]
22  -.396  (.363)  -1.320  (1.162)  .165  (.414)
[1.082]  [.453]
23  -.334  (.348)  -1.171  (.991)  .076  (.389)
[.973]  [.527]
24  .675  (.656)  2.334  (1.405)  .559  (.540)
[1.430]  [.539]
25  -.075  (.310)  -.319  (.400)  -.023  (.336)
[.451]  [.435]
26  -.284  (.296)  -1.004  (.838)  .054  (.322)
[.813]  [.445]45 -
Table A-2
Import-Related Firm Adjustment (controlling for industry-specific  and age effects)
(with firm production share as size control)
(OLS standard errors in parentheses; White's heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors in brackets)
Probit  Selection Correction  Uncorrected
Survival equation'  Adjustment equation  Adjustment equation
(obs - 895)  (obs - 429)  (obs =  429)
Maximum Likelihood  O.LS.  O.LS.
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Intercept  -.073  -.085  -16.053  -16.942  .390  .371
(.077)  (.121)  (3.933)  (4.053)  (.096)  (.145)
[3.680]  [3.784]  [.099]  [.157]
-.065  -.065  -1.021  -1.059 - -.168  -.169
Ind.Imports  (.070)  (.070)  (.221)  (.225)  (.087)  (.087)
[.220]  [.221]  [.089]  [.088]
Firm Share  *  .093  .095  1.922  2.056  .055  .064
%LImports  (.255)  (.255)  (.539)  (.557)  (.307)  (.311)
[.520]  [.536]  [.287]  [.289]
Herfindahl *  -.164  -.165  -2.046  -2.163  .288  .285
%dImports  (.218)  (.218)  (.614)  (.627)  (.260)  (.261)
i.551]  [.567]  [.263]  [.266]
Firm Share  1.450  1.442  14.571  14.980  -1.024  -1.044
(.407)  (.412)  (3.753)  (3.774)  (.425)  (.441)
[3.467]  [3.474]  [.3691  [.382]
Age  .004  .086  .007
(.032)  (.043)  (.040)
[.044]
Inverse Mills' ratio  19.649  20.418
(4.699)  (4.777)
[4.417]  [4.475]
Reesierz  !abelled  by (1) ctclude  the  age  term  while  those  labelled  by  (2) control  for this  additional  firm-specific  effect.-46  -
Table A-3
Im2ort-Related Firm Adjustment (controlling for industrv-specific  and age effects)
(with firm employment as size control)
(OLS standard errors in parentheses; White's heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors in brackets)
Probit  Selection Correction  Uncorrected
Survival equation]  Adjustment equation  Adjustment equation
(obs  =  895)  (obs - 429)  (obs - 429)
Maximum Likelihood  O.LS.  O.LS.
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Intercept  .032  -.007  -14.649  -15.535  .370  .378
(.133)  (.148)  (5.559)  (5.755)  (.164)  (.177)
[5.9471  [6.120]  [.171]  [.188]
Yoa  -.151  -.149  -1.925  -1.946  -.082  -.083
Ind.Imports  (.066)  (.066)  (.686)  (.678)  (.079)  (.080)
[.738]  [.724]  [.080]  [.080]
Firm Share  *  .655  .659  7.372  7.644  -.340  -.343
%iMmports  (.207)  (.207)  (2.864)  (2.899)  (.254)  (.256)
[3.064]  [3.077]  [.266]  [.270]
Herfindahl *  -.092  -.104  -1.157  -1.347  .201  .206
%dImports  (.218)  (.219)  (.566)  (.620)  (.262)  (.265)
[.555]  [.609]  [.259]  [.265]
Firm Size  .015  .007  .168  .081  -.036  -.033
(Employm.)  (.034)  (.036)  (.086)  (.062)  (.042)  (.046)
[.089]  [.062]  [.041]  [.046]
Age  .021  .256  -.005
(.034)  (.103)  (.042)
[.110]  [.043]
Inverse Mills' ratio  19.215  19.733
(7.109)  (7.134)
[7.610]  [7.584]
Regsiom iabelled  by  (1) aclude the  ap term  while  those  labelled  by  (2) wttrol  for  ths additloal  thm-specific  effec.PRE  Working  Pane.  Series
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